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Gender Differences in Moral Influences on Adolescents’ Eyewitness
Identification
In this study, 232 (89 11- to-12-year-olds, 71 13- to-14-year-olds; 72 15- to-16-year-olds)
students recruited from grades 6th–11th in an urban public high school participated in a
study of eyewitness identification. The focus of this study was on the effects of age,
gender and moral orientation on decisional bias and, as a secondary outcome, on
accuracy (using signal detection analysis). The primary purpose of this and previous
studies in this series is to uncover implicit moral decision-making in decisional bias. In
this study the perpetrator, the bystanders and the foil were all females. Prior to
completing the eyewitness identification task, participants were given instructions that
emphasized either (a) fairness and crime prevention, or (b) neither. These instructions had
no discernible effect on accuracy but, as in past studies, younger participants (below the
age of 13) had lower decisional criteria, resulting in a higher rate of false
alarms/positives. Further, those who judged the transgression as worse had a lower
decisional criterion, indicating more false alarms. Females were more accurate than the
males in identifying the female perpetrator and scored significantly higher on how bad
they would feel if they were the victim than did the males.
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There is a long history of psychological studies focused on children’s and
adolescents’ face recognition and eyewitness identification (e.g., Brewer, Weber, &
Semmler, 2005; Cultice, Somerville, & Wellman, 1983; Cutler & Penrod, 1995; Malpass
& Lindsay, 1999; Meissner, Tredoux, Parker, & MacLin, 2005; Pozzulo, 2017; Shapiro
& Penrod, 1986; Wixted & Mickles, 2014). These studies include findings of age
differences. For example, young children have been shown not only to be less accurate
when making forced choices but also more susceptible to interrogators’ influence even
when this influence is exercised subtly (e.g., Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Keast, Brewer &
Wells, 2007; Muensterberg, 1908). In general, the relationship between actual eyewitness
performance and confidence appears to be inconsistent (e.g., Keast, Brewer & Wells,
2007). Further, attempts have been made to improve children’s eyewitness identification
(i.e., using structured interview protocols and unbiased questioning) with limited success
(e.g., Lamb et al., 2007, Roebers, Moga, & Schneider, 2001; Sporer et al., 1995).
There is also substantial evidence of gender differences in face recognition, much
of it showing that females perform better than males on facial recognition tasks (e.g.,
Herlitz & Loven, 2013; Hills & Lewis, 2010; Loven, Herlitz, & Rehnman, 2011; Mason,
1986; Rehnman & Herlitz, 2006; Meissner et al., 2005). This suggests that there might
also be a gender difference in eyewitness identification when the ‘perpetrator’ and ‘foils’
are females. Thus, testing some of our past findings (below) featuring a female
perpetrator and foils is important for fully understanding eyewitness identification
phenomena.
However, we should note that we bring a different perspective to these
phenomena than has heretofore been the case. Virtually all of the studies cited above
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examined eyewitness identification/facial recognition primarily as an exercise in
perceptual judgment, memory and general decision-making. However, a moment’s
reflection makes clear that eyewitness identification involves not just (visual) perception,
memory and (general) decision-making, but also a kind of implicit moral decisionmaking or moral judgment. Our reasoning is as follows: a false positive/alarm threatens
to send an innocent person to jail whereas a false negative/miss risks letting a guilty
person go free. Eyewitness identification therefore clearly involves, inter alia, a kind of
moral decision at an implicit level of functioning. Thus, our focus is not just to discover
predictors of the accuracy of eyewitness identification, as do most studies in this research
area, but rather to use the task as a type of measure of implicit moral judgment/decisionmaking.
Yet, how do we to study eyewitness identification as moral decision-making?
Two complementary strategies come to mind: First, while the visual input remains
identical, the moral meaning may be varied by means of a voice-over that provides
variations in the meaning of the event (e.g., whether intended or not or creating small or
large damage). Second, one may examine the eyewitness’s performance not just in terms
of general accuracy, but also in terms of the propensity to make false positive
identifications/false alarms relative to false negatives/misses. We use the eyewitness
identification task and framework as a vehicle for studying implicit moral decisionmaking.
This is where signal detection theory (SDT) methodology becomes essential. The
SDT (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Swets, 1986) approach to measurement enables one
to differentiate between (a) overall accuracy (how well a person can discriminate between
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‘Signal Present’ and ‘Signal Absent’/ sensitivity (d’) and (b) decisional bias, which is of
primary interest in our studies and which represents the minimum level of (internal)
certainty needed to decide that a signal was present (termed C). High bias scores reflect a
more stringent or conservative decisional bias, indicating fewer false alarm judgments
relative to misses, corrected for chance and lower bias scores reflect a looser or less
conservative decisional bias, indicating more false alarms relative to misses.
The specific measure of decisional criterion used (here, C2 and C3) indicates
where the decisional criterion is set: for C2 (between ‘a little sure that it isn’t the person’,
‘a little sure that it is the person’) and for C3, ‘very sure it is the person’ and the other
three alternatives). Both measures of C indicate whether the eyewitness has a propensity
to make one type of error over another, (e.g. false alarms over misses) independent of
accuracy, but use different criteria for a positive and negative judgment.
SDT methodology has a long history in the study of perceptual judgments (e.g.
Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Meissner, et al., 2005; Swets et al., 1986) and in studies of
memory (e.g., Van Zandt, 2000; Vickers, 1979). In this study and in others in this
program of research, we have used this SDT methodology, along with (a) variations in
the framing of the visually identical event to have different moral meaning and (b)
measurements of not just overall accuracy (sensitivity) but also the propensity to make
false alarms (decisional bias) as tools to study implicit moral decision-making. It is the
two measures of C (decisional criteria) which is of special interest in our studies
although, of course, we also look at sensitivity (d’).
In our past research (Spring, Saltzstein & Peach, 2012; Spring & Saltzstein, &
Vidal, 2015; Spring & Saltzstein, 2017) , involving six separate studies, we have found
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that the way in which the event (film) is described or framed (e.g., the act was intended
but caused little material damage vs. unintended but caused major material damage)
interacts with the age of the eyewitness to affect the rate of false positives, so that
younger children (10-12 years of age) had lower decisional bias scores (reflected in more
false alarms) than did older children (13-15 years of age) when major damage was done
even if it was unintended. Whereas the reverse was true when the act was intended but
led to little material damage. This relates to Piaget’s well-known finding in the Moral
Judgment of the Child (1932) that young children (below the age of adolescence) often
ignore the actor’s intentions and instead judge the morality of an act in terms of the
material outcomes of the act. We have found (Spring & Saltzstein, 2017) that this focus
on material outcomes rather than intentions by younger children (roughly 10- to 12-year
olds) is revealed in eyewitness identification in the form of false alarms, i.e., more false
alarms when the outcome is bad and fewer false alarms when the outcome is minor even
though the intentions may be malevolent.
Consequently, as a result of these previously published studies, we have come to
think of these eyewitness judgments as a form of implicit moral decision, which may
deviate from explicit moral decision in terms of its relationship to the age of the
eyewitness and the features of the act (Spring & Saltzstein, 2017). We should note that
the above applies to children between the ages of 10-15, and not to 7- to 9-year-old
children whose eyewitness identification was not affected by the ‘framing’ of the filmed
event. Initially, we were puzzled by this aberration from our general findings; however,
systematic post-task interviewing solved the puzzle. Consistently, in the postidentification interviews, when the participants were asked in child friendly terms, why
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false alarms/misses are bad to make as a witness, the 7- to 9 year olds indicated that they
did not think of false alarms and misses as having any moral significance, a finding in
and of itself whereas, the older children, ages 10 and older, did make their decisions in a
way that frequently comports with moral considerations, e.g., intentions. For this reason,
we no longer include 7- to 9-year olds as participants in our studies. These findings help
confirm our underlying assumption about eyewitness identification, namely that
eyewitness identification for older children (those above 9 years of age), adolescents and
adults is a type of implicit moral decision-making.
Nevertheless, there has been an important, if unintended, limitation in this
program of research: although all the studies included male and female child and
adolescent participants/eyewitnesses, those filmed (perpetrator and foils) were all males.
This error of omission was unintentional and unplanned. Perhaps, the omission was due
to the general observation (e.g., Denno, 1994) that males commit significantly more
crimes than females. However, these findings of lower incidence of crime by females
primarily pertain to crimes of violence, which for the most part do not figure into our
research. Nonetheless, a general gender difference of crime rate should not blind us to the
goals of understanding the ‘psychologies’ of both genders. Therefore, we decided to
conduct a comparable study featuring young women as the ‘perpetrator’/target and
‘foils’/bystanders to see whether our findings would be replicated.
Our major premise, which we believe that we have now established as valid and
relevant, is that the eye-witnessing of suspects in crimes involve, inter alia, making an
implicit moral decision. Therefore, when examined as a type of implicit moral judgment,
there are two relevant strands of reasoning about morality with a long history in
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philosophy, namely deontological (e.g., Kant, 1785/1964; Rawls, 1971) and
consequentialist (e.g., Mills, 1861/1998). Put succinctly, these might be represented as (a)
‘being fair or just’ and (b) ‘acting so as to maximize good and minimize bad outcomes’
respectively. In this context, they might be represented as (1) ‘you wouldn’t want to
convict an innocent person’ and (2) ‘don’t let the perpetrator get away with it’. We
believe that these two moral orientations may influence the propensity to make one or the
other type of error, namely false alarms or misses differently for different age groups and
genders.
Further, Gilligan (1977) has proposed and, on occasion, demonstrated that while
there is much overlap, males favor a deontological or justice orientation towards moral
situations, whereas females favor a consequentialist orientation where the goal is to do or
produce ‘good’. This claim has found support in some of her later studies (e.g., Gilligan,
1988) but has been challenged in others (e.g., Bucciarelli, 2015; Held, 1995: Jaffee &
Hyde, 2000; Keller 1995). A related finding has also been reported by Hoffman (e.g.,
1987) who in a number of studies has found that females, young girls and women have an
earlier and stronger capacity for empathy, on average, than males have. While this is
surely a complex claim and one that remains in dispute (e.g., Klein & Hodges, 2001), it
deserves attention from researchers because of its potential relevance to eyewitness
identification. This rationale may then serve as the theoretical and empirical context from
which our study arises.
First, we wished to test whether age differences in decisional bias, which were
found in earlier research involving all male actors, would also occur when all female
actors were those to be judged. Second, we wished to see whether prompting a focus on
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fairness and prevention ‘being fair or just’ and ‘acting so as to maximize good and
minimize bad outcomes’ would have a differential effect on eyewitness performance, and
third, whether any effects would be different by the age and/or, most especially, the
gender of participants. Thus, one approach (set of instructions) focuses on finding and
punishing the culprit whereas the other focuses on not convicting an innocent person.
These two goals permeate eyewitness identification and make it a difficult task. Rather
than contrast these two, we highlighted them in one (experimental) condition, but omitted
them from the other (control) condition. Our expectation was that younger children
would focus on the ‘identifying and punishing the culprit’ orientation whereas the older
children would focus on a ‘not identifying and punishing’ orientation. For example, we
hypothesized that younger children (11- to 12-year-olds) would commit more false
alarms in the experimental condition whereas the older children and adolescents (13- to
14-year-olds and 15 – to 16-year-olds) would commit fewer false alarms. In other words,
the younger children would be less cautious and the older children more cautious.
Furthermore, females would not only be more accurate in their judgments but make fewer
false positives or false alarms than males in an effort to avoid being unfair.

Method
Participants
The participants were 232 (89 11- to 12-year-olds, 71 13- to 14-year-olds, 72 15to 16-year-olds) students recruited from grades 6th– 11th in a public high school in New
York City, with the usual parental permission and student assent. There were no
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consequences for nonparticipation. Students participated in small groups in their
classroom. One hundred and twenty-one participants were randomly assigned to the
experimental condition and 122 in the control condition.
The experimenters were the first author, a Ph.D. psychologist, and a high school
student research assistant in his senior year at another NYC public high school.
Design and Stimulus Materials
The film: Simulating a typical high school event, four female students, with
medium length brown hair pulled back with a rubber-band, are working on a group
project at a table in a classroom. They are engaged in a conversation while working at the
table for 30 seconds; while the film pans the faces of all four women. A fifth female
student enters the classroom, approaches the group, and offers a distraction (sharing Girl
Scout Cookies). Through the editing of the film, the profiles (left, center, right) of each
face lasted 23 seconds. None of the students in the film had discerning physical features
such as jewelry, tattoos, or head ornaments. One of the original four students takes the
opportunity to steal an iPhone from one of the other students and puts it in her
pocketbook while the other females are in conversation and preoccupied. All girls then
proceed to sit down at the table. One girl visibly searches for her phone and appears to be
quite upset when the she realizes it is gone. The video then fades to a black PPT slide.
There is no audible sound of the actors. Immediately after the film viewing, in the
experimental condition, on a black PPT slide, a voice-over describes the events and
informs the participants (eyewitnesses) that the “stealing” of the iPhone will result in an
expulsion from school, and then the voice-over emphasizes the need to preserve fairness
by not convicting an innocent person, and the need for consequences, thereby,
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discouraging the transgression from occurring again. In the control condition, on a black
PPT slide a voice-over describes the events and informs the participants (eyewitnesses)
that this theft will result in expulsion from school without any emphasis on preserving
fairness or any of the negative consequences of choosing incorrectly. The film lasted
approximately 138 seconds. In order to accommodate the school schedule, clusters of
participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions.
Following the film, the participants were asked to write down everything that they
could recall and to complete 4 questions in the questionnaire. In the first two questions,
participants explicitly judged “how bad” for each of the following questions: “how bad
was what the student did, stealing another student’s iPhone?”; “how bad would you feel
if another student stole your iPhone?” The participants were asked to choose on a Likert
scale with the following response options: not bad, a little bad, pretty bad, and very, very
bad. The third question asked “what type of punishment would you suggest for the
student who stole the iPhone?” Response options included: a) no punishment (but noted
on the student’s academic file for the stealing); b) in school detention (1-2 days); c) out of
school detention (3-days); and d) expulsion from school. For the fourth question,
participants were asked, “Do you recall the instructions that were given to you at the end
of watching the film?” This question served as a manipulation check. After it was clear
that the participants understood the film and completed their responses, they began the
eyewitness facial recognition/identification task.
No opportunity was given for the participants to discuss the events among
themselves. Judging from the participants’ written recital of the events immediately after
viewing the film, we found that the events in the film were very comprehendible even for
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the youngest participants. The participants were asked to identify who of the six
individuals, presented seriatim, was the perpetrator and how certain they were that the
individual was the person who stole the iPhone using a four-point scale, from ‘very sure
it was not the girl’ to ‘a little sure it was not the girl’ to ‘a little sure it was the girl’ to
‘very sure it was the girl’. There were a total of 54 successive judgments, which resulted
from six individuals (the four female students at the craft table, the female student who
brought cookies into the classroom, and a female student with similar facial features who
was not in the film at all) who were each presented from three perspectives (frontal, right
and left profiles) for a total of 18 photos. These 18 photos were presented in three
identical sequences for a total of 54 presentations. The sequences were random except
that the same person never appeared consecutively. In this study, the sequential lineup
presentation mode was used rather than a simultaneous lineup because sequential lineups
have sometimes been found to decrease lineup bias (Carlson & Carlson, 2014; Carlson,
Gronlund, & Clark, 2008; Gronlund, Carlson, Dailey, & Goodsell, 2009; Lindsay et al.,
1991; Pozzulo, 2017) although this claim has recently been called in question (Mickes,
Flowe & Wixted, 2012). Following the facial recognition presentation task, participants
answered three more questions in counter-balanced order regarding the seriousness
(“badness”) of the types of mistakes witnesses can make. These questions asked
participants to rate on a three-point scale how bad they thought it would be to do each of
the following things during an eyewitness identification task: “Saying it is the person
who stole the phone, when it really wasn’t” and “Saying it was not the person who stole
the phone, when it really was.” They were also asked why they selected their responses to
these questions in order to help assess their moral reasoning. The final question was to
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check the extent to which participants recalled the instructions they were given prior to
the eyewitness identification task, “Could you describe what you were thinking about
when deciding that it was or was not the student who took the iPhone?”
Procedure
Prior to viewing the video participants were told that they are going to watch a
video that was taken from hidden cameras in a high school and instructed that their job
was to act as a witness and to watch the film closely. In the experimental condition
(Fairness and Consequences) both were included in a counter-balanced order: "Please
look at the individual profile of faces. We are interested to see if you can identify the
thief. She may or not be in these photos. It is important that you catch the right person
because you wouldn't want someone who didn't steal anything to be expelled; it wouldn't
be fair. There’s been a lot of theft at school and we want to stop it. So, it’s important we
catch the person who is doing it. We must make an example that there are consequences
like being expelled for stealing.” In the control condition only the stem was included,
“Please look at the individual profile of faces. We are interested to see if you can identify
the thief. She may or not be in these photos.”
The 18 color profile photo slides were presented on a PPT format timed for 7
seconds for each profile of the students in the film and the one student who was not in the
film at all. Judgments were made for each presentation of an individual profile.
Participants circled one choice: that they were either “very sure it isn’t”, “a little sure it
isn’t”, “a little sure it is” or “very sure it is”. Groups of participants were arranged
according to their availability at the school. Assignment to the Experimental and Control
conditions was random for groups of participants. There were 111 participants in the
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Control condition (54 males and 57 females) and 121 participants in the Experimental
condition (57 males and 64 females).
Analyses
The data, both the signal detection measures (decisional bias) and traditional
moral judgment measures, were analyzed using multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) and structural equation models (SEM). Analyses were carried out using
SPSS version 25 and Stata version 15. The key independent variable of interest was
assignment to experimental condition; the experimental condition was exposed to
reminders of the need for fairness and consequences, while those in the control condition
received no such reminders. We were also interested in the effects of age and gender and
how condition might interact with age and gender.
Outcome variables of interest:
Using signal detection theory analysis, we assessed participants’ tendencies to
make false alarm judgments over misses using decisional bias criterion C3, i.e.,
contrasting the alternative “very sure it is” the thief with the other three alternatives,
independent of sensitivity (d’). As noted, this criterion was chosen because past research
(Pozzulo, 2017) has found that young children are particularly prone to very confidently
identify the perpetrator and because in past studies we have consistently found clearest
results when using this criterion. Our other focus was on decisional bias C2: the split
between “a little sure it is” and “a little sure it isn’t.” In addition, the participants were
asked to rate how serious the act, actor and outcome for the victim was for the ‘crime’
and by indicating what the punishment should be for stealing a student’s phone.
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Other variables we looked at included sensitivity (d’), the ability to discriminate
between the target and the target + noise (Heeger, 2009). Higher d’ scores indicate that
participants are more capable of discriminating between the perpetrator (target) and the
foils/others in the film and one who was not (target + noise). We also looked at an
explicit moral judgment measure, Focus More On, which reflected whether participants
self-reported focusing more on fairness or (crime) prevention. Additionally, we looked at
participants’ self-reports of ‘how bad they would feel’ if their iPhones were stolen
(Ufeelbad), recommendations for punishment, opinions regarding the severity of the
threat and judgments regarding which type of error it would be worse to make: a false
alarm or miss. Each of these latter measures is described in greater detail below.
In addition to our main interest in children’s eyewitness testimony itself, we were
also interested to see whether the pattern of findings for the traditional, explicit measures
and implicit measures (especially our measures of decisional bias, described above)
showed similar patterns (effects of age, condition, and interactions between the two) or
rather diverged as we have found in our past research, cited above.
Results
Implicit Measures/Signal Detection Analysis.
Summary statistics for our two measures of decisional bias, C3 and C2, as well as
d’ (d-prime) for participants in each experimental condition, gender and age group are
included in Table 1 and Figure 1.
Decisional bias: As in the prior studies described above, C3 was related to age, (F
(2, 226) =4.436 =, p<.001, eta2 =.038); as was C2, (F(2,226) =8.279, p<.001, eta2 =.068).
This suggests that younger children, 10-12-year olds, used a laxer criterion than did older
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(15- to-16-year-old) children, when making eyewitness identification, thus producing
more false alarms (see figure 1). This age difference has been found in all of our studies,
as reviewed in the introduction, and now extends to the eyewitness identification of
females. This relationship with age was not affected by whether instructions, as described
(emphasizing the need for fairness and prevention vs. neither), were introduced.
However, the effect of age on C2 did differ for participants depending on the measure of
Ufeelbad, their responses to the question “how bad would you feel if your iPhone was
stolen,” which was asked on a four-point Likert scale (response options: not bad, a little
bad, bad, very bad) (p<0.02). For participants who responded that they would feel ‘not
bad’ or ‘a little bad’, C2 showed a negative relationship with age, while C2 showed a
positive relationship with age for participants who reported that they would feel ‘pretty
bad’ or ‘very, very bad’ (see Figure 2). Novel for studies in this series, there was a near
significant difference in sensitivity (d’) for gender, F(1, 226) = 3.810, p < .052, eta2
=.017 indicating that females, in the study, were more accurate than males (see Figure 1).
Explicit Moral Judgment Measures: Focus on Prevention or Fairness
A significant negative relationship was found between focus more on prevention
(Focus More On) and age (F (2,226) = 12.42; p< .001; eta2= .099), such that the younger
children focused more on prevention whereas the older children focused more on
fairness, which is consistent with the actual signal detection measures described above.
Gender also showed a marginally significant relationship with Focus More On, (F(1,226)
= 3.419; p<.066; eta2= .015) with females tending to focus more on fairness compared
with males. Additionally, Focus More On was negatively correlated with C3 (decisional
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criteria) in the expected direction. That is, those participants who focused more on
prevention than on fairness had lower C3 scores, indicating more false alarms.
Using structural equation modelling, we tested whether a model that included the
direct effects of Focus More On, gender, and age on C3, along with the indirect effects of
gender and age through Focus More On C3 would have higher incremental validity
compared to a model that included only the main effects of each variable on C3.
Surprisingly, we did not find evidence to support this hypothesis.
Confidence Judgments
How bad would you feel? (Ufeelbad) A significant difference for gender was
found for the question “how bad would you feel if your iPhone was stolen,” which was
assessed by a Likert scale (response options: not bad; a little bad; pretty bad; very, very
bad) (F(1,226) = 5.029, p <.026, eta2 .022) with girls reporting feeling worse. In addition,
the interaction between gender and age group had an effect on Ufeelbad that approached
statistical significance (F(2,226) =2.704 p<.069, eta2 .023), such that Ufeelbad tended to
decrease with age for boys, but not for girls (see Figure 3).
Judgments regarding punishment, severity of the theft, and which error is worse
to make. A significant effect was obtained for age group on the four-point Punishment
scale (no punishment to expulsion), F (2,26) = 7.246 p < .001, partial eta squared = .06).
Not surprisingly, the younger (11- to-12-year-old) children advocated a harsher
punishment. A significant effect was also obtained for age group and on the scale “how
bad was what the student did,” which was measured using a Likert scale (response
options: not bad; a little bad; pretty bad; very, very bad) (F (2,226) = 6.196 p < .002,
partial eta squared = .052). Younger children (11- to-12-year olds) rated the theft as a
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worse crime than did older children. A significant effect was obtained for age group on
‘which error is worse’, the decisional criteria for “false alarms, misses or both are errors
are equally bad” (F (2,226) = 4.755 p < .009, partial eta2 = .04). Eleven to 12-year-old
children were also more likely than the older children to judge misses as worse than false
alarms (see Table 2).
Discussion
The findings indicate that the effect of age on decisional bias is robust. While
prior research (Spring, Saltzstein & Peach, 2012; Spring & Saltzstein, & Vidal, 2015;
Spring & Saltzstein, 2017) using an eyewitness investigation task involving a male
perpetrator and male foils has demonstrated the effect of age on decisional bias, this
study shows that the same effect occurs when a female perpetrator and foils are involved.
A new finding was that female adolescents and pre-adolescents used a more stringent
criterion when identifying a (female) thief than do adolescents and pre-adolescents males.
The differences involving gender are particularly interesting since past research (briefly
summarized in the introduction) has shown that females have also been found to be more
accurate when identifying female faces than male faces. However, including the indirect
effects of gender and age through one attitudinal measure, Focus More On ‘fairness or
prevention’ on C3, the split between “a little sure it is’ and ‘very sure it is’ the
perpetrator, surprisingly did not improve the predictive validity of our model. This might
be interpreted as supporting the idea that this kind of decision-making is implicit, i.e.,
outside of conscious awareness.
Further, the prompting of the more justice-based and compassion-based
orientations had no effect whatsoever, possibly indicating that these ‘promptings’ by the

19
Gender Differences in EWI

researchers may not have been necessary possibly because the participants, pre-adolescents
and adolescents, already bring these orientations to the task and therefore any instructions
are ineffective, This interpretation is consistent with the idea that, in general, females tend
to be more ‘compassionate’ than males, as mentioned in the introduction, but here
demonstrated on an eyewitness identification task, which as we have emphasized earlier,
may be treated as involving implicit moral decision-making.
Thus, this study has both confirmed some previous findings, for example, the
relationship between age and decisional criteria, and found some new ones, especially the
tendency for girls to use a more conservative decisional criterion than boys when
identifying a perpetrator. What has been confirmed is that both males and female
perpetrators are more likely to be positively misidentified (indicated by the low
decisional criterion, C scores) by younger eyewitnesses.
Finally, and more generally, the data re-affirm the usefulness of treating
eyewitness identification as involving inter alia, a kind of implicit moral decisionmaking. The findings with regards to gender are particularly interesting in that they
expand our understanding of gender and social cognition, in general, and in particular
gender and eyewitness decision-making.
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Table 1. C2, C3 and d-prime by Gender, Age Group & Experimental Condition
C2
C3
d-prime
mean (SD)
mean (SD)
mean (SD)
Gender
Male (n=111)
.49 (.56)
1.38 (.55)
.65 (1.11)
Female (n=121)
.43 (.56)
1.34 (.57)
.96 (1.23)
Age Group
11- to-12 (n=89)
.30 (.47)
1.25 (.55)
.68 (1.10)
13- to-14 (n=72)
.45 (.60)
1.33 (.56)
.84 (1.13)
15- to-16 (n=71)
.66 (.57)
1.52 (.53)
.95 (1.32)
Experimental Condition
Experimental (n=121)
.43 (.58)
1.35 (.58)
.80 (1.24)
Control (n=111)
.49 (.55)
1.37 (.53)
.82 (1.12)
Note: Age was a significant predictor of both C3 (p<.001) and C2 (p<.001).
Additionally, gender predicted dprime, although the effect was only marginally
significant (p<.052).
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Table 2. Age Group Differences in Judgments Regarding Punishment, Which Error is
Worse to Make, and Severity of Theft
11- to-12
13- to-14
15- to-16
(n=89)
(n=72)
(n=71)
Proportion of
Proportion of
proportion
respondents
respondents
Punishment
No punishment/academic note (1)
.08
.13
.15
In school detention (2)
.17
.38
.39
Out-of-school detention (3)
.53
.38
.35
Expulsion (4)
.22
.11
.11
Which error is worse to make
Miss
.43
.31
.22
Equally bad
.06
.04
.01
False alarm
.52
.65
.76
Severity of theft
Not bad
.00
.01
.01
A little bad
.01
.01
.04
Pretty bad
.42
.68
.51
Very, very bad
.57
.30
.43

Note: The values in each cell of the table represent the proportion of respondents in each
age group who gave the indicated response. Age group was a significant predictor of
punishment (p<.001), which error is worse to make (p<.009), and severity of theft
(p<.002). Compared to older children, younger children tended to think stealing the
iPhone was a worse crime and advocated for harsher punishments for the perpetrator of
the crime. Younger children were also more likely than older children to judge misses as
worse than false alarms, although the majority of participants in each age group judged
false alarms to be the worse error.
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Figure 1. Boxplots of C2, C3 and d-prime by gender, age group and experimental
condition Note: The boxplots display the median and interquartile ranges for C2 (left
panel), C3 (middle panel) and d-prime (right panel) for groups of participants broken
down by age and gender. In these plots, different age groups are indicated along the xaxes, and different genders are distinguished by the colors of the bars; the bars for males
are dark gray while the bars for females are light gray. C2 and C3 are both measures of
the decisional criterion participants used when deciding whether each person displayed
in the photo lineup was the guilty party with C2 representing a split between ‘a little sure
that it isn’t the person’ and ‘a little sure that it is the person’ and C3 representing a split
between ‘very sure it is the person’ and the other three alternatives. d-prime is a measure
of participants’ overall accuracy.

24
Gender Differences in EWI

Figure 2.
Effect of age on C2 differs on Ufeelbad
Note: Ufeelbad_bin = 0 indicates participants who responded ‘not bad’ or ‘a little bad’
in response to our question about how they would feel if their iPhone was taken, whereas
Ufeelbad_bin = 1 indicates participants who responded ‘pretty bad’ or ‘very, very bad.’
There was a significant interaction between Ufeelbad and age (p<0.02). For participants
who responded ‘not bad’ or ‘a little bad’, C2 showed a negative relationship with age,
while C2 showed a positive relationship with age for participants who reported they
would feel ‘pretty bad’ or ‘very, very bad’.
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Figure 3. Effect of age on Ufeelbad differs for males and females
Note: The interaction between gender and age group had an effect on Ufeelbad that
approached statistical significance (p<.069). Ufeelbad tended to decrease with age for
boys, but not for girls.
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